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Abstract— DO-178B was based on the consensus of the 
avionic software community as it existed in 1992. Twenty two 
years after publication, we have no publically available 
experimental data as to its efficacy. It appears to work extremely 
well, since there have been no hull loss accidents in passenger 
service ascribed to software failure. This is a comforting and 
surprising result. However, if we don’t know why DO-178B 
works so well, there is a danger that we could stop doing 
something that really matters, which could lead to an accident. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
I was greatly inspired by the book “The Machine That 
Changed the World” [1], which described research conducted 
in the late 1980s by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) into best practice in the Japanese, US and European car 
industries as they existed at that time. I was impressed not 
only that the authors were able to identify fundamental 
differences in working practice between the most productive 
and the least productive car manufacturers, but that they were 
given access to detailed metrics that allowed them to quantify 
the result of following those working practices. The book 
concluded that lean production (a term coined by one of the 
MIT researchers) “uses less of everything compared with mass 
production – half the human effort in the factory, half the 
manufacturing space, half the investment in tools, half the 
engineering hours to develop a new product in half the time”. 
II. SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 
I am saddened that no published data exists for the efficacy 
of software engineering practices. The programming 
languages, tools and methodologies that are most widely 
adopted seem to be chosen on the basis of fads and fashions 
rather than any scientific evidence for their effectiveness or 
otherwise. Andy German [2] published the results of 
conducting static analysis on avionic software for the 
Lockheed C-130J. Andy concluded that “the poorest language 
for safety-critical applications is C with consistently high 
anomaly rates. The best language found is SPARK (Ada), 
which consistently achieves one anomaly per 250 lines of 
code”. Nevertheless, weakly-typed languages continue to be 
used widely for software development. 
One of the best books I have read on comparative software 
engineering practices is “Rise & Resurrection of the American 
Programmer” [3] by Ed Yourdon. Yourdon interviewed a 
number of organizations who he believed to exemplify best 
practice, including an Indian laboratory that was the first to 
achieve Capability Maturity Model (CMM) Level 5 and 
Microsoft, who were (and are) the World’s best-selling 
software publisher. He found that Microsoft are rightly 
focused on maximizing product sales, not on minimizing their 
software development costs (which form only a small 
percentage of their total costs) or minimizing their software 
defect rate (since eliminating more defects could delay the 
introduction of a new product, potentially allowing a 
competitor to steal market share). It therefore follows that we 
should not look to the most successful software companies 
such as Microsoft for best practice when developing software 
for safety-critical applications. As it happens, I believe 
Microsoft to be the most improved software company of the 
last decade. For example, most Blue Screens of Death 
(BSODs) were not caused by Microsoft software, but by faulty 
third-party device drivers. The incidence of BSODs has been 
reduced dramatically by the deployment of tools based on 
formal methods, e.g. Static Device Verifier [4]. 
In the so-called soft sciences such as psychology and 
economics, I have noticed a sharp divide between 
experimental approaches that insist on the use of experiments 
to prove or disprove hypotheses, and theoretical approaches 
that develop complex theories from an initial set of axioms. 
For example, Robert Merton and Myron Scholes won the 1997 
Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for their work on the 
Black-Scholes equation. The failure by the financial 
community to understand the limitations of this model was 
one of the causes of the sub-prime lending crisis [5]. 
I worry that so little emphasis is placed on experiments in 
software engineering. I am also concerned there may be flaws 
in the little theory that we do have. For example, most 
software reliability models assume a normal (Gaussian) 
distribution of software defects. A software reliability model 
using a normal distribution assumes that software failures are 
independent of each other. This is not the case – software 
defects tend to be clustered. Mandelbrot published a book in 
2004 [6] which predicted a stock market crash (which 
occurred in 2008) because the financial models assumed a 
normal distribution of share price movements. Mandelbrot 
claimed that share prices follow a power (fractal) distribution, 
not a normal distribution. The danger he cited was that a 
normal distribution would give the same prediction as a power 
distribution most of the time, but would considerably 
underestimate the probability of major fluctuations in the 
stock market. 
III. DO-178B  
I am concerned that, 22 years after it was published, we 
have no statistical evidence as to the efficacy of DO-178B [7]. 
DO-178B appears to work very well. Despite the fact there 
are over 22,000 certified jet airplanes in service worldwide 
[8], no hull loss accidents in passenger service have been 
ascribed to software failure. I find this a comforting and 
surprising result. 
The goal of DO-178B is to ensure that the system 
requirements allocated to software have been implemented 
correctly in the software. DO-178B defines five software 
levels, from Level A software, which could cause or 
contribute to a failure of system function resulting in a 
catastrophic failure condition for the aircraft, to Level E 
software, whose failure would have no effect on aircraft 
operational capability or pilot workload. There is no publically 
available evidence of the defect rate achieved by DO-178B 
Level A, let alone any difference between the five software 
levels or the efficacy of any of the individual DO-178B 
objectives. Andy German [2] reported “when Level A was 
compared to Level B, no significant difference in anomaly 
rates identified by static analysis was found”. 
Requirements-based testing is a strength of DO-178B. 
Peter Ladkin’s compendium of computer-related incidents 
with commercial aircraft [9] shows that in the majority of 
incidents (e.g. the Lufthansa A320 runway over-run at 
Warsaw), the software faithfully implemented requirements 
that specified unsafe behavior under some unforeseen 
circumstance. Even DO-178B Level A software is far from 
defect-free, but there seem to have been very few incidents 
caused by software failing to satisfy its requirements. 
John Rushby [10] wrote, “the standards-based approach to 
certification employed with DO-178B does seem to be 
effective, and this is probably because its prescriptions are 
based on experience and are sound, and because they are 
executed diligently and monitored conscientiously – but also 
perhaps because of factors outside the standards relating to 
safety culture, experience and conservatism”. John worries 
that “increased outsourcing and other changes in the aircraft 
industry reduce some factors that may, implicitly, have 
contributed to the safety of aircraft software (e.g. 
organizational experience and safety culture)”. 
I worry that we have previously relied less on automation 
than we have supposed. For example, when an Air Data 
Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) failure caused an in-flight-
upset on a Boeing 777 [11], the pilot was able to disengage the 
autopilot and land normally. There seems to be growing 
evidence (e.g. Colgan Air Flight 3407, Air France 447) that 
crews are becoming less able to cope with failures of 
automation, meaning that we need to improve pilot training, 
improve the reliability of the automation or accept that some 
accidents will happen when the automation fails. 
IV. PROPOSED EXPERIMENT 
It would be helpful to determine the efficiency of the five 
DO-178B software levels by measuring the number of defects 
found in relation to the software verification effort expended. 
The ideal would be a study that used historical data to 
assess the in-service history of software developed to DO-
178B. It is considered unlikely that such data will be made 
available by industry or that it even exists. 
An achievable experiment would be to take some pre-
existing software and to verify that software to DO-178B 
Levels A, B, C and D. A suitable candidate would be open 
source software such as CUnit or OpenSSL. We suggest that 
one team could verify the software to Level D, while a second 
team could verify the software to Level C, then carry out the 
additional work necessary to meet the objectives of Level B 
and Level A in turn. 
V. CONCLUSION  
Those seeking to reduce costs argue that some of the DO-
178B objectives or activities are unnecessary and could be 
eliminated. The danger is that, if we don’t know why DO-
178B works, we could stop doing something that really 
matters, which could lead to an accident. 
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